This project aims to provide empirical answers to core questions in the literature on the decentralization of the public sector by investigating ways in which group incentives can be used to improve productivity for workers that carry on interlinked tasks resulting in multiple outcomes. Specifically, this research aims to provide a better understanding of the organization of the public sector, bureaucrats’ incentives, and the potential interactions between monetary and non- monetary incentives to enhance public good provision at the local level. In order to isolate the causal effect of each of the hypothesized channels for improving performance, IERPE will run a randomized control trail in which each local government will be randomly assigned to a treatment or control condition: (i) monetary and non-monetary incentives, or (ii) control. In addition, to fill knowledge gaps in what truly motivates bureaucrats to exert more effort and commit to their organizations’ missions, this research could be extended to other decentralized public offices with similar characteristics. Moreover, the project’s location across various Beninese communes mitigates the risk of scaling up small projects with selected samples, thus increasing the external validity of the study’s potential findings.
Sponsored by: International Growth Centre (IGC) – London School of Economics and Political Sciences (LSE)